The problem of the divided majority: Preference aggregation under uncertainty

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Đura-Georg Granić ^{granic@ese.eur.nl}
• 关键词：D70 ; D71 ; D80
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：133
• 期：Complete
• 页码：21-38
• 全文大小：1218 K
• 卷排序：133

文摘

I experimentally study a novel repeated-game, divided majority setting. I compare three voting mechanisms under two information structures. Without knowing others’ preferences Plurality Voting leads to inefficient outcomes. Approval Voting and Borda Count dissolve information imperfections efficiently. The Condorcet loser is often defeated independently of the treatment.