Choking under time pressure: The influence of deadline-dependent bonus and malus incentive schemes on performance

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• 作者：Andrea Essl ^{andrea.essl@iop.unibe.ch} ; Stefanie Jaussi ; ^{stefanie.jaussi@iop.unibe.ch}
• 关键词：C91 ; D03 ; J33
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：133
• 期：Complete
• 页码：127-137
• 全文大小：945 K
• 卷排序：133

文摘

We examine the effect of individual loss aversion on performance under time pressure. In a laboratory experiment, participants had to work on a real effort task. We used deadline-dependent contracts, framed in bonus and malus terms. When working under a malus contract loss averse individuals performed worse. These individuals needed more time to reply and were less able to avoid maluses.