Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies
详细信息 查看全文
- 作者：Ivá ; n Barreda-Tarrazonaa ; ivan.barreda@eco.uji.es" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Nikolaos Georgantzí ; sb ; n.georgantzis@reading.ac.uk" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Constantine Manasakisc ; manasakis@uoc.gr" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Evangelos Mitrokostasd ; evangelos.mitrokostas@port.ac.uk" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Emmanuel Petrakise ; petrakis@uoc.gr" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：Experimental economics ; Oligopoly theory ; Managerial delegation ; Endogenous contracts
- 刊名：Economic Modelling
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：April 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：54
- 期：Complete
- 页码：205-217
- 全文大小：933 K
文摘
- •
We test owners' strategies over the terms and the type of managerial compensation.
- •
We focus on the choice between relative performance vs profit-revenue rewards.
- •
Relative performance contracts prevail over profit-revenue ones.
- •
Owners will choose incentives that deviate from strict profit maximization.
- •
Deviation from profit oriented incentives increases managerial aggressiveness.