An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach to Modeling VMI Policies

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• 作者：Fidel Torres^* ; ^{ftorres@uniandes.edu.co" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Cesar Garcia-Diaz^** ; ^{ce.garcia392@uniandes.edu.co" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Naly Rakoto-Ravalontsalama^*** ; ^{rakoto@mines-nantes.fr" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：Supply chain management ; game theory ; stability analysis
• 刊名：IFAC-PapersOnLine
• 出版年：2014
• 出版时间：2014
• 年：2014
• 卷：47
• 期：3
• 页码：10737-10742
• 全文大小：333 K

文摘

The strategy of integration known as VMI (Vendor-Managed Inventory) allows the coordination of inventory policies between producers and buyers in supply chains. Based on a new proposed model for the implementation of VMI in a chain of two links composed of a producer and a buyer, this paper studies the evolution of individual strategies of the producer and the buyer by a formalism derived from the theory of evolutionary games. The conditions that determine the stability of evolutionarily stable strategies are derived and analyzed. Work results specify analytical conditions that favor the implementation of VMI on traditional chains without VMI.