RFID unilateral distance bounding protocols: A trade-off between mafia and distance fraud

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• 作者：Rahim Entezari ; ^{r_entezari@mut.ac.ir} ; Hossein Bahramgiri ^{bahramgiri@mut.ac.ir} ; Mahnaz Tajamolian ^{tajamolian@mut.ac.ir}
• 关键词：RFID ; Distance bounding protocols ; Authentication ; Mafia fraud ; Distance fraud
• 刊名：Computer Communications
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：15 January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：98
• 期：Complete
• 页码：97-105
• 全文大小：1462 K
• 卷排序：98

文摘

Distance Bounding (DB) protocol is a lightweight protocol which is used in RFID, NFC and WSN. These protocols enable an entity to determine an upper bound on the physical distance to another entity as well as to authenticate the other entity. This leads to rejection of the requests located out of this distance limitation. So far, many unilateral DB protocols have been proposed to resist mafia and distance fraud attacks. In this paper, we present two unilateral DB protocols. The first one uses predefined delay and two random binary challenges (EBT1) [1] whereas the second protocol uses predefined delay and two different challenges: predefined challenges and random challenges (EBT2). The resistance of these protocols against mafia and distance fraud attacks is better than other unilateral DB protocols. By changing the two random binary challenges into predefined challenge and random challenge, we obtain better resistance to mafia fraud and lower resistance to distance fraud. In addition, the proposed protocols can be applied to passive RFID tags and do not require an extra final signature after the fast bit phase.