Gender differences in ultimatum games: Despite rather than due to risk attitudes

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• 作者：Aurora Garc&iacute ; a-Gallego^a ; ^b ; ^{mgarcia@eco.uji.es} ; Nikolaos Georgantz&iacute ; s^a ; ^c ; ^d ; ^{ngeorgantzis@ugr.es} ; Ainhoa Jaramillo-Gutié ; rrez^e ; ^f ; ^{Ainhoa.Jaramillo@uv.es}
• 关键词：C90 ; D03 ; D81
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
• 出版年：2012
• 出版时间：June, 2012
• 年：2012
• 卷：83
• 期：1
• 页码：42-49
• 全文大小：269 K

文摘

We analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game framed as a situation of employee-employer negotiation over salaries. Parallel to this, we elicit subjects?risk attitudes. In the existing literature, it has often been conjectured that gender differences in strategic environments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Our evidence suggests that both gender and risk-related effects co-exist in ultimatum bargaining. However, differences in risk attitudes cannot explain gender effects in ultimatum bargaining.