Strategic thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations

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• 作者：Dario Bauso^a ; ^b ; ^{d.bauso@sheffield.ac.uk" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Tamer Başar^c ; ^{basar1@illinois.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：Mean-field games ; Coalitional game theory ; Differential games ; Optimal control
• 刊名：European Journal of Control
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：November 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：32
• 期：Complete
• 页码：1-15
• 全文大小：1536 K

文摘

This paper studies the strategic behavior of a large number of game designers and studies the scalability, stability and robustness of their allocations in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU). For each TU game, the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. In each game, a game designer allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The approach is based on the theory of mean-field games with heterogeneous groups in a multi-population regime.