Optimal prize-rationing strategy in all-pay contests with incomplete information

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• 作者：Xuyuan Liu^a ; ^{rmilx@nus.edu.sg} ; Jingfeng Lu ; ^b ; ^{ecsljf@nus.edu.sg} ; ^{jingfenglu70@gmail.com}
• 关键词：Multi-prize contest ; Prize rationing ; All-pay auction ; Incomplete information
• 刊名：International Journal of Industrial Organization
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：50
• 期：Complete
• 页码：57-90
• 全文大小：1189 K
• 卷排序：50

文摘

We consider optimal prize rationing in all pay contests with incomplete information. The objective is to incentivize the contestants to exert maximal productive effort. Both expected total effort and expected highest effort from agents are considered. For both goals, the optimal number of prizes weakly increases with number and quality of contestants. Expected highest effort maximization requires a smaller set of prizes to be awarded.