Task Similarity and Transfer of an Inductive Reasoning Training
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- 作者：Roth-van der Werf ; Trudy (G.) J. M. ; Resing ; Wilma C. M. ; Slenders ; Adriana P. A. C.
- 刊名：Contemporary Educational Psychology
- 出版年：2002
- 出版时间：April, 2002
- 年：2002
- 卷：27
- 期：2
- 页码：296-325
- 全文大小：162 K
文摘
Two studies were conducted with a systematized, Dutch version (Klauer, Resing, & Slenders, 1996) of the Klauer Denktraining program (Klauer, 1989b), a cognitive training program intended to foster children's inductive reasoning ability. The aim of both studies was to validate Klauer's theoretical claim of “paradigmatic” transfer, i.e., transfer based on an understanding of the deep structure of induction-type problems (Klauer, 1988). Klauer's theory of paradigmatic transfer implies that children trained with a program like the Denktraining will be relatively undistracted by differences in surface features between the inductive tasks from the training program and new inductive tasks. Participants in the first experiment were 9-year-old children from special schools (N = 31), while 7-year-olds from regular elementary education (N = 119) participated in the second experiment. Training was accomplished using Slenders and Resing's (1995) standardized training procedure. Transfer was tested for a set of inductive tasks of which the surface features varied in similarity to the Denktraining tasks: The tasks were superficially equivalent, similar, or dissimilar. Effects on the superficially equivalent and superficially similar tasks were put on a par with practice effects; effects on the superficially dissimilar tasks were taken to indicate paradigmatic transfer. To assess even better of whether the Denktraining's effects surpass practice effects, in the second experiment a practice condition was included. The results found in the first experiment seem to support Klauer's theory of paradigmatic transfer; the results obtained in the second experiment do not. In analyzing the conflicting nature of the findings, we discuss a plausible alternative explanation of the outcome of the first experiment. We conclude that the claim of paradigmatic transfer may be seriously doubted.