Private contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer?

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• 作者：Jeanine Mikló ; s-Thal ; ^{jeanine.miklos-thal@simon.rochester.edu} ; Greg Shaffer ^{shaffer@simon.rochester.edu}
• 关键词：Principal-agent games ; Divide and conquer strategies ; Network effects ; Two-sided markets ; Union formation ; Input licensing
• 刊名：International Journal of Industrial Organization
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：50
• 期：Complete
• 页码：460-472
• 全文大小：434 K
• 卷排序：50

文摘

We consider a class of principal-agent games with contracting externalities. With public offers, the principal may be able to obtain its preferred outcome by means of a divide-and-conquer strategy. With private offers and passive out-of-equilibrium beliefs, divide-and-conquer offers cannot arise in equilibrium.