SPHINCS: Practical Stateless Hash-Based Signatures

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• 作者：Daniel J. Bernstein (15) (17)
  Daira Hopwood (16)
  Andreas H眉lsing (17)
  Tanja Lange (17)
  Ruben Niederhagen (17)
  Louiza Papachristodoulou (18)
  Michael Schneider
  Peter Schwabe (18)
  Zooko Wilcox-O鈥橦earn (16)
  
  15. Department of Computer Science ; University of Illinois at Chicago ; Chicago ; IL ; 60607鈥?045 ; USA
  17. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science ; Technische Universiteit Eindhoven ; P.O. Box 513 ; 5600 MB ; Eindhoven ; The Netherlands
  16. Least Authority ; 3450 Emerson Ave. ; Boulder ; CO ; 80305鈥?452 ; USA
  18. Digital Security Group ; Radboud University Nijmegen ; P.O. Box 9010 ; 6500 GL ; Nijmegen ; The Netherlands
  
• 关键词：Post ; quantum cryptography ; One ; time signatures ; Few ; time signatures ; Hypertrees ; Vectorized implementation
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：9056
• 期：1
• 页码：368-397
• 全文大小：553 KB
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• 作者单位：Advances in Cryptology -- EUROCRYPT 2015
• 丛书名：978-3-662-46799-2
• 刊物类别：Computer Science
• 刊物主题：Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
  Computer Communication Networks
  Software Engineering
  Data Encryption
  Database Management
  Computation by Abstract Devices
  Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1611-3349

文摘

This paper introduces a high-security post-quantum stateless hash-based signature scheme that signs hundreds of messages per second on a modern 4-core 3.5GHz Intel CPU. Signatures are 41 KB, public keys are 1 KB, and private keys are 1 KB. The signature scheme is designed to provide long-term \(2^{128}\) security even against attackers equipped with quantum computers. Unlike most hash-based designs, this signature scheme is stateless, allowing it to be a drop-in replacement for current signature schemes.