Who is Appointed to What Position? The Politics of Appointment in Quangos of Korea

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• 作者：Sanghee Park (1)
  Byong Seob Kim (1)
  
• 关键词：Quangos ; Executives ; Politics of appointment ; Patronage
• 刊名：Public Organization Review
• 出版年：2014
• 出版时间：September 2014
• 年：2014
• 卷：14
• 期：3
• 页码：325-351
• 全文大小：460 KB
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• 作者单位：Sanghee Park (1)
  Byong Seob Kim (1)
  
  1. Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea
  
• ISSN：1573-7098

文摘

This study identifies the determinants of appointment of executives in quangos. Using data from 85 quangos in Korea over 15?years between 1993 and 2007, we investigate the degree to which various characteristics of organizational actors affect the choice of executives. Three organizational actors include presidents, sponsoring government departments, and the concerned quangos. Although results vary by executive position, the findings of the empirical analysis with multinomial probit and generalized linear mixed models support the idea that the appointment of quango executives is not the result of presidential choice but that of the interactions among the key organizational actors, with different incentives and resources, on the appointment. Compared to former bureaucrats, presidential allies are more likely to be appointed when presidents have more political support from the National Assembly and it is easier for insiders to be promoted as executives from larger and older quangos with clear legal origins.