Theoretical game analysis of position auctions according to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism with two-stage ranking

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• 作者：N. G. Blinov
• 关键词：contextual advertising ; CTR ; position auctions ; GSP ; VCG ; Nash equilibrium ; click value
• 刊名：Moscow University Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：October 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：40
• 期：4
• 页码：165-170
• 全文大小：513 KB
• 刊物类别：Mathematics and Statistics
• 刊物主题：Mathematics
  Mathematics
  Russian Library of Science
  
• 出版者：Allerton Press, Inc. distributed exclusively by Springer Science+Business Media LLC
• ISSN：1934-8428
• 卷排序：40

文摘

Different types of position auctions are considered. A position auction is a mechanism for the allocation of advertising space in search engine results to a user-defined query. Advertisers make bids they are willing to pay the search engine for a click to their website. The search engine determines whose advertisements will get to the page and in what position, based on the bids of all the advertisers. Different types of such auctions are discussed using the example of the Yandex search engine based on the Vickrey–Clarke–Grovesmechanism. The main result is a formalization of the concept of an auction with two-stage ranking and its balance test.