NIH biomedical funding: evidence of executive dominance in swing-voter states during presidential elections

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• 作者：Alberto Batinti
• 关键词：NIH ; Political economy ; Congressional dominance ; Presidential politics
• 刊名：Public Choice
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：September 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：168
• 期：3-4
• 页码：239-263
• 全文大小：2,152 KB
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Public Finance and Economics
  Political Science
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-7101
• 卷排序：168

文摘

This paper explores the role of presidential politics in influencing the distribution of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding. In particular, it investigates how the distribution of NIH funding is stirred towards institutions located in swing-voter US states during presidential elections. In doing so, it fills a gap left in the literature on the political economy of the NIH, which previously focused on the role of membership in the Committees on Appropriations in both chambers of the US Congress. First, it is found that NIH funded performers in states where the Presidential Electoral Importance (PEI) increases by 1 %, receive, on average 0.7–0.8 % more funding. Second, this effect is robust to three additional checks. Third, I run heterogeneity tests, where the direction and change of the elasticity coefficient fit plausible assumptions on the mechanism of presidential influence on NIH funding in swing-voter states. I finally estimate, that the average lower bound of the overall impact of PEI on the NIH budget is between 2 and 3 %. It reaches a maximum of 10 % for specific states, fiscal years, and presidential mandates.