The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Yukinori Iwata
• 关键词：Nomination ; Nominating voters ; Arrow ; consistent preference domains ; Arrow’s impossibility theorem
• 刊名：Theory and Decision
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：November 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：81
• 期：4
• 页码：535-552
• 全文大小：509 KB
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Economic Theory
  Game Theory and Mathematical Methods
  Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behavioral Sciences
  Methodology of the Social Sciences
  Operation Research and Decision Theory
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-7187
• 卷排序：81

文摘

In this paper, we introduce an Arrovian social choice framework with the process of nomination. We consider a two-stage social choice procedure in which some alternatives are first nominated by aggregating the opinions of nominators, and then the society makes a collective choice from the nominated alternatives by aggregating the preferences of voters. Each nominator’s opinion is a positive, negative, or neutral view as to whether each alternative deserves to be eligible for collective decision making. If a voter is a nominator, his preference space is restricted by his opinion as follows: he always prefers positive alternatives to neutral ones and neutral alternatives to negative ones, according to his opinion. When each nominating voter has such a preference space, we first characterize Arrow-consistent preference domains at the second stage of the social choice framework. Second, we find a resolution of Arrow’s impossibility theorem when at least one nominating voter exists.