刊物主题:Economic Theory; Economics general; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences;
出版者:Springer International Publishing
ISSN:2196-1093
卷排序:4
文摘
In the classic Bertrand duopoly, a firm need only undercut its competitor by an arbitrarily small amount in order to sell to all the consumers. This paper generalises the Bertrand model so that a firm must be more than \(\varepsilon \) cheaper than its competitor in order to take the market. I characterise the unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. Firms earn strictly positive expected profits in equilibrium which are increasing in \(\varepsilon \). The model is also a special case of the price-setting stage of the Hotelling model with a non-uniform distribution of consumers. The model can also be formulated as one of sequential search without replacement from a discrete distribution of prices.