Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly

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• 作者：Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz
• 关键词：Compensation systems ; Share ownership ; Unions ; Cournot ; Bertrand
• 刊名：Portuguese Economic Journal
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：December 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：15
• 期：3
• 页码：173-195
• 全文大小：
• 刊物主题：Economics, general; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Economic Policy; Microeconomics; Econometrics;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1617-9838
• 卷排序：15

文摘

Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages share ownership. Finally, under Bertrand competition neither firm shares ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages.