A problem for confirmation theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy

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• 作者：Martin L. Jönsson ; Elias Assarsson
• 关键词：Conjunction fallacy ; Inverse conjunction fallacy ; Bayesian epistemology ; Bayesian confirmation theory ; Formal measures of confirmation
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：February 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：173
• 期：2
• 页码：437-449
• 全文大小：630 KB
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• 作者单位：Martin L. Jönsson (1)
  Elias Assarsson (1)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy, Lund University LUX, Helgonavägen 3, 221 00, Lund, Sweden
  
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy
  Logic
  Epistemology
  Philosophy of Mind
  Philosophy of Religion
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0883

文摘

This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the paper explores four different ways for the confirmation theorist to come to terms with the problem, and argues that none of them are successful.