In Search of Lost Nudges

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Guilhem Lecouteux
• 刊名：Review of Philosophy and Psychology
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：September 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：6
• 期：3
• 页码：397-408
• 全文大小：208 KB
• 参考文献：Andersen, S., and L. Ross. 1984. Self-knowledge and social inference: I. The impact of cognitive/affective and behavioral data. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 46: 280-93.View Article
  Bernheim, B.D., and Rangel, A. 2009. Beyond revealed preferences: Choice-theoretic foundations for behavioral welfare economics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 51-04.
  Bovens, L. 2009. The ethics of nudge. In Preference change: Approaches from philosophy, economics and psychology, ed. T. Grüne-Yanoff and S. Hansson, 207-19. Berlin: Springer.View Article
  Broome, J. 1991. Weighing goods: Equality, uncertainty, and time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
  Buss S. 2014. Personal autonomy. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, ed. Winter Zalta, E., 2014 edition.
  Conly, S. 2013. Against autonomy. Justifying coercive paternalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  Frederick, S. 2003. Time preference and personal identity. In Time and decision: Psychological perspectives in intertemporal choice, ed. G. Loewenstein, D. Read, and R. Baumeister. New York: Russel Sage.
  Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein, and T. O’Donoghue. 2002. Time discounting and time preference: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature 40(2): 351-01.View Article
  Hausman, D., and B. Welch. 2010. To nudge or not to nudge? The Journal of Political Philosophy 18(1): 123-36.View Article
  Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2): 263-92.View Article
  Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky (eds.). 2000. Choice, value, and frames. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  Korsgaard, C.M. 1989. Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18(2): 101-32.
  Liberman, N., Y. Trope, and E. Stephan. 2007. Psychological distance. Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles 2: 353-83.
  Mill, J.S. 1859. On liberty. London: Longman, Roberts & Green Co.
  O’Donoghue, T., and M. Rabin. 1999. Doing it now or later. American Economic Review 89(1): 103-24.View Article
  Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  Proust, M. 1993. In Search of Lost Time, Volume V The Captive & The Fugitive. Translated by C.K. Scott Moncrieff and T. Kilmartin, revised by D.J. Enright. New York: The Modern Library.
  Samuelson, S. 1937. A note on the measurement of utility. Review of Economic Studies 4: 155-61.View Article
  Samuelson, W., and R. Zeckhauser. 1988. Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1: 7-9.View Article
  Sunstein, C. 1998. Selective fatalism. The Journal of Legal Studies 27(S2): 799-23.View Article
  Sunstein C. 2014. Why nudge? The politics of libertarian paternalism. Yale University Press.
  Sunstein, C., and R. Thaler. 2003. Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron. University of Chicago Law Review 70: 1159-202.View Article
  Thaler, R., and S. Benartzi. 2004. Save more tomorrow: Using behavioral economics to increase employee savings. Journal of Political Economy 110: S164–S187.View Article
  Thaler, R., and C. Sunstein. 2003. Libertarian paternalism. AEA Papers and Proceedings 93(2): 175-79.View Article
  Thaler, R., and C. Sunstein. 2008. Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  Wilson, T., and D. Gilbert. 2003. Affective forecasting. In Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. 35, ed. M. Zanna, 345-11. San Diego: Elsevier.
  
• 作者单位：Guilhem Lecouteux (1)
  
  1. Ecole Polytechnique, Department of Economics (EXCESS Laboratory, CNRS UMR 9194), Route de Saclay, 91128, Palaiseau, France
  
• 刊物主题：Philosophy of Mind; Cognitive Psychology; Neurosciences; Epistemology; Developmental Psychology; Philosophy of Science;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1878-5166

文摘

This paper discusses the validity of nudges to tackle time-inconsistent behaviours. I show that libertarian paternalism is grounded on a peculiar model of personal identity, and that the argument according to which nudges may improve one’s self-assessed well-being can be seriously questioned. I show that time inconsistencies do not necessarily reveal that the decision maker is irrational: they can also be the result of discounting over the degree of psychological connectedness between our successive selves rather than over time (Parfit 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press). Time inconsistency can call for paternalism if and only if we accept that an individual is characterised by stable “true-preferences over time-dependent outcomes, and that she is rationally required to make time-consistent choices. This model is descriptively and normatively questionable. I then argue that behavioural findings may still justify paternalistic interventions, but on a non-welfarist basis.