Frege and Carnap on the normativity of logic

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• 作者：Florian Steinberger
• 关键词：Rudolf Carnap ; Gottlob Frege ; Normativity of logic ; Rationality ; Normativism about the mental
• 刊名：Synthese
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：194
• 期：1
• 页码：143-162
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy of Science; Epistemology; Logic; Philosophy of Language; Metaphysics;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0964
• 卷排序：194

文摘

In this paper I examine the question of logic’s normative status in the light of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. I begin by contrasting Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic with that of his teacher, Frege. I identify two core features of Frege’s position: first, the normative force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such (in a sense to be clarified). While Carnap breaks with Frege’s absolutism about logic and hence with the notion that any system of logic should have a privileged claim to correctness, I argue that there is a sense in which Carnap’s framework-relative conception of logical norms has a constitutive role to play: though they are not constitutive for the conceptual activity for thinking, they do nevertheless set the ground rules that make certain forms of scientific inquiry possible in the first place. I conclude that Carnap’s principle of tolerance is tamer than one might have thought and that, despite remaining differences, Frege’s and Carnap’s conceptions of logic have more in common than one might have thought.