Central Bank Credibility before and after the Crisis

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• 作者：Michael D. Bordo ; Pierre L. Siklos
• 关键词：Monetary policy credibility ; Interest rate targeting ; Money growth targeting ; Non ; linearity and asymmetry in monetary policy ; Central banking institution
• 刊名：Open Economies Review
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：28
• 期：1
• 页码：19-45
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：International Economics; Development Economics; European Integration; Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics; Economic Policy;
• 出版者：Springer US
• ISSN：1573-708X
• 卷排序：28

文摘

A new measure of credibility is constructed as a function of the differential between observed inflation and some estimate of the inflation rate that the central bank targets. The target is assumed to be met flexibly. Credibility is calculated for a large group of both advanced and emerging countries from 1980 to 2014. Financial crises reduce central bank credibility and central banks with strong institutional feaures tend to do better when hit by a shock of the magnitude of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The VIX, adopting an inflation target and central bank transparency, are the most reliable determinants of credibility. Similarly, real economic growth has a significant influence on central bank credibility even in inflation targeting economies.