Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines

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• 作者：Sjaak Hurkens ; Nir Vulkan
• 关键词：Bargaining ; Deadlines ; Markets ; C73 ; C78
• 刊名：International Journal of Game Theory
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：August 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：44
• 期：3
• 页码：599-629
• 全文大小：647 KB
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• 作者单位：Sjaak Hurkens (1)
  Nir Vulkan (2)
  
  1. Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) and Barcelona GSE, Campus UAB, 08193, Bellaterra, Spain
  2. Sa?d Business School and Worcester College, University of Oxford, Park End Street, Oxford, OX1 1HP, UK
  
• 刊物主题：Economic Theory; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Operations Research/Decision Theory; Game Theory/Mathematical Methods;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1432-1270

文摘

This paper analyzes bargaining outcomes when agents do not have stationary time preferences (as represented by a constant discount factor) but are pressed by firm deadlines. We consider a dynamic model where traders with heterogeneous deadlines are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. A trader leaves the market when an agreement has been reached or when his deadline expires. Our analysis encompasses both the case of perfect and imperfect information about the partner’s deadline. We define, characterize and show the existence of a stationary equilibrium configuration. We characterize when delay occurs and when deadlines are missed in equilibrium and show that the payoffs of traders are strictly increasing and concave in own deadline, unless bargaining takes place under imperfect information and no delay occurs, in which case all pairs immediately agree on an almost even split. We provide comparative statics exercises and illustrate our results by some examples.