Hale on the Absoluteness of Logical Necessity

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• 作者：Hashem Morvarid
• 关键词：Absolute necessity ; Competing modality ; Logical necessity ; Essence ; Essentialist modalities
• 刊名：Acta Analytica
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：March 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：32
• 期：1
• 页码：1-11
• 全文大小：
• 刊物主题：Philosophy, general; Logic; Metaphysics; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1874-6349
• 卷排序：32

文摘

Hale (Metaphysics, 10, 93–117, 1996, 2013) has argued that logical necessities are absolute in the sense that there is no competing kind of modality under which they may be false. In this paper, I argue that there are competing kinds of modality, which I call “essentialist modalities,” under which logical necessities may be false. Since it is counter-intuitive to say that logical necessities are not absolute, my argument, if correct, shows that Hale’s characterization of absolute necessity does not adequately capture the intuitive notion of absolute necessity. Then, a qualified version of Hale’s characterization of absolute necessity is proposed. On the qualified version, the absoluteness of logical necessities is no longer defeated by essentialist possibilities.