Derrida and the Philosophy of Law and Justice

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• 作者：Simon Glendinning
• 刊名：Law and Critique
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：July 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：27
• 期：2
• 页码：187-203
• 全文大小：390 KB
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy of Law
  Roman Law, Law History and Canon Law
  Law Theory and Philosophy
  Political Philosophy
  Criminology & Criminal Justice
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-8617
• 卷排序：27

文摘

Readings of Derrida’s work on law and justice have tended to stress the distinction between them. This stress is complicated by Derrida’s own claim that it is not ‘a true distinction’. In this essay I argue that ordinary experiences of the inadequacy of existing laws do indeed imply a claim about what would be more just, but that this claim only makes sense insofar as one can appeal to another more adequate law (whether the projection of a new law or an existing ‘higher’ law). Exploring how Derrida negotiates a subtle path between classical Platonism and classical conventionalism about justice, the attempt is made to take seriously Derrida’s aim to affirm the idea of a ‘mystical’ foundation of the authority of laws by taking ‘the use of the word “mystical” in what I venture to call a rather Wittgensteinian direction’.KeywordsConventionalismDerridaJusticeLawPlatonismWittgenstein