Culture, Truth, and Science After Lacan

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• 作者：Grant Gillett
• 关键词：Culture ; Scientific truth ; Philosophical semantics ; Lacan
• 刊名：Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：December 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：12
• 期：4
• 页码：633-644
• 全文大小：340 KB
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• 作者单位：Grant Gillett (1)
  
  1. Otago Bioethics Centre, University of Otago, PO Box 913, Dunedin, New Zealand
  
• 刊物主题：Theory of Medicine/Bioethics; Ethics; Medical Law;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1872-4353

文摘

Truth and knowledge are conceptually related and there is a way of construing both that implies that they cannot be solely derived from a description that restricts itself to a set of scientific facts. In the first section of this essay, I analyse truth as a relation between a praxis, ways of knowing, and the world. In the second section, I invoke the third thing—the objective reality on which we triangulate as knowing subjects for the purpose of complex scientific endeavours like medical science and clinical care. Such praxes develop robust methods of “keeping in touch” with disease and illness (like biomarkers). An analysis drawing on philosophical semantics motivates the needed (anti-scientistic) account of meaning and truth (and therefore knowledge) and underpins the following argument: (i) the formulation and dissemination of knowledge rests on language; (ii) language is selective in what it represents in any given situation; (iii) the praxes of a given (sub)culture are based on this selectivity; but (iv) human health and illness involve whole human beings in a human life-world; therefore, (v) medical knowledge should reflectively transcend, where required, biomedical science towards a more inclusive view. Parts three and four argue that a post-structuralist (Lacanian) account of the human subject can avoid both scientism and idealism or unconstrained relativism. Keywords Culture Scientific truth Philosophical semantics Lacan