Alief or belief? A contextual approach to belief ascription
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- 作者：Miri Albahari (1)
- 关键词：Alief ; Belief ; Belief ; ascription ; Judgment ; Action ; Emotion ; Animal cognition ; Contradictory beliefs
- 刊名：Philosophical Studies
- 出版年：2014
- 出版时间：February 2014
- 年：2014
- 卷：167
- 期：3
- 页码：701-720
- 全文大小：234 KB
- 作者单位：Miri Albahari (1)
1. University of Western Australia, Crawley, WA, Australia - ISSN：1573-0883
文摘
There has been a surge of interest over cases where a subject sincerely endorses P while displaying discordant strains of not-P in her behaviour and emotion. Cases like this are telling because they bear directly upon conditions under which belief should be ascribed. Are beliefs to be aligned with what we sincerely endorse or with what we do and feel? If belief doesn’t explain the discordant strains, what does? T.S. Gendler has recently attempted to explain all the discordances by introducing a controversial new cognitive category—associative clusters called ‘alief- Others think that belief explains all the discordancy cases, while others argue that in-between belief does the trick, and so on. Most advocates of the different positions, indeed, assume that their favoured analysis will explain the whole range of discordancy cases. This paper defends what I call the ‘contextual view- where I argue that overturning this assumption of uniformity leads to more nuanced account of belief-ascription. On the contextual view, which analysis applies to which case depends on the discordancy case at hand. Perhaps a height-phobic stepping on a glass platform deserves different treatment to a hesitant stepper. I ground the contextual view in a biologically functional account of the alief/belief distinction, which construes alief as a real cognitive category but without the explanatory reach Gendler gives it. This functional distinction yields a principled strategy for determining the correct application of analysis to discordancy case.