Multistage public education, voting, and income distribution

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• 作者：Katsuyuki Naito ; Keigo Nishida
• 关键词：Majority voting ; Public education ; Multistage education ; Human capital accumulation ; Income distribution
• 刊名：Journal of Economics
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：120
• 期：1
• 页码：65-78
• 全文大小：
• 刊物主题：Economics, general; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Microeconomics; Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics; Public Finance; Game Theory, Economics, Social
• 出版者：Springer Vienna
• ISSN：1617-7134
• 卷排序：120

文摘

This paper proposes a theory to study the formulation of education policies and human capital accumulation. The government collects income taxes and allocates tax revenue to primary and higher education. The tax rate and the allocation rule are both endogenously determined through majority voting. The tax rate is kept at a low level, and public funding for higher education is not supported unless the majority of individuals have human capital above some threshold. Although public support for higher education promotes aggregate human capital accumulation, it may create long-run income inequality because the poor are excluded from higher education.