Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

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• 作者：Luís Aguiar-Conraria ; Pedro C. Magalhães ; Christoph A. Vanberg
• 关键词：Election design ; Participation quorum ; Approval quorum ; Laboratory experiment
• 刊名：Experimental Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：December 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：19
• 期：4
• 页码：886-909
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Behavioral/Experimental Economics; Microeconomics; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Operation Research/Decision Theory;
• 出版者：Springer US
• ISSN：1573-6938
• 卷排序：19

文摘

Many democratic decision making institutions involve quorum rules. Such rules are commonly motivated by concerns about the “legitimacy” or “representativeness” of decisions reached when only a subset of eligible voters participates. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of the two most common types of quorum rules: a participation quorum and an approval quorum. We find that both types of quora lead to lower participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. This discouraging effect is significantly larger under a participation quorum than under an approval quorum.