Noncooperative games, coupling constraints, and partial efficiency
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- 作者：Sjur Didrik Flåm
- 关键词：Coupling constraints ; Normalized Nash equilibrium ; Partial efficiency ; Bilateral exchange ; Monotonicity ; Stability ; Convergence
- 刊名：Economic Theory Bulletin
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：October 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：4
- 期：2
- 页码：213-229
- 全文大小：489 KB
- 刊物主题：Economic Theory; Economics general; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences;
- 出版者：Springer International Publishing
- ISSN：2196-1093
- 卷排序：4
文摘
Many noncooperative settings require sharing of aggregate holdings—be these of natural resources, production tasks, or pollution permits. This paper considers instances where the shared items eventually become competitively priced. For that reason, the solution concept incorporates features of Nash and Walras equilibria. Focus is on how the concerned agents, by themselves, may reach an outcome of such sort. A main mechanism is direct bilateral exchange, repeated time and again.