Evolutionary Equilibria in Network Markets

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Thomas J. Webster
• 关键词：Evolutionary equilibrium ; Game theory ; Herding ; Network goods ; Positive feedback effects
• 刊名：Atlantic Economic Journal
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：September 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：44
• 期：3
• 页码：325-334
• 全文大小：352 KB
• 刊物主题：Economics general; Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics; Microeconomics; International Economics; Public Finance & Economics;
• 出版者：Springer US
• ISSN：1573-9678
• 卷排序：44

文摘

Evolutionary game theory predicts that new survival strategies arise from random mutations. Over time, mutants genetically encoded with the superior survival strategy will have more offspring and nonmutants will be driven from the population. This paper argues that the introduction of a mutant technology with strong positive feedback and cascade effects into the market for a network good may result in something like an evolutionarily stable equilibrium that increases social welfare.