Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core

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• 作者：Francesc Llerena (1)
  Carles Rafels (2)
  
• 关键词：Cooperative TU ; game ; Core ; Undominated imputations ; Reasonable outcomes ; C71
• 刊名：International Journal of Game Theory
• 出版年：2007
• 出版时间：April 2007
• 年：2007
• 卷：35
• 期：4
• 页码：603-615
• 全文大小：204KB
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• 作者单位：Francesc Llerena (1)
  Carles Rafels (2)
  
  1. Department of Business Administration, Rovira i Virgili University, Avda. Universitat 1, 43204, Reus, Spain
  2. Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics and CREB, University of Barcelona, Avda. Diagonal 690, 08034, Barcelona, Spain
  
• ISSN：1432-1270

文摘

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominated imputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem 1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms also characterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balanced games, and superadditive games.