Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of?TU?games

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• 作者：Francesc Llerena (1)
  Carles Rafels (2)
  
• 关键词：Coalitional games ; Convex games ; Stable sets ; Core ; 91A12
• 刊名：TOP
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：July 2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：21
• 期：2
• 页码：313-322
• 全文大小：426KB
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• 作者单位：Francesc Llerena (1)
  Carles Rafels (2)
  
  1. Departament de Gestió d’Empreses, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Avda. Universitat 1, 43204, Reus, Spain
  2. Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial, Universitat de Barcelona, Avda. Diagonal 690, 08034, Barcelona, Spain
  
• ISSN：1863-8279

文摘

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a max-convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas-five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.