Reduced games and egalitarian solutions

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Francesc Llerena ; Llúcia Mauri
• 关键词：Cooperative game ; Reduced games ; Core ; Lexmax solution
• 刊名：International Journal of Game Theory
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：November 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：45
• 期：4
• 页码：1053-1069
• 全文大小：
• 刊物主题：Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Behavioral/Experimental Economics; Operation Research/Decision Theory;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1432-1270
• 卷排序：45

文摘

For a class of reduced games satisfying a monotonicity property, we introduce a family of set-valued solution concepts based on egalitarian considerations and consistency principles, and study its relation with the core. Regardless of the reduction operation we consider, the intersection between both sets is either empty or a singleton containing the lexmax solution Arin et al. (Math Soc Sci 46:327–345, 2003). This result induces a procedure for computing the lexmax solution for a class of games that contains games with large core Sharkey (Int J Game Theory 11:175–182, 1982).