Strong and Weak Rarity Value: Resource Games with Complex Price–Scarcity Relationships

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• 作者：Reinoud Joosten
• 关键词：Stochastic games ; Limiting average rewards ; Common pool resource games ; Jointly ; convergent strategies ; Rarity value
• 刊名：Dynamic Games and Applications
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：March 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：6
• 期：1
• 页码：97-111
• 全文大小：1,378 KB
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• 作者单位：Reinoud Joosten (1)
  
  1. School of Behavioural, Management and Social Sciences, University of Twente, POB 217, 7500 AE, Enschede, The Netherlands
  
• 刊物类别：Mathematics and Statistics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Communications Engineering and Networks
  Operations Research and Mathematical Programming
  Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behavioral Sciences
  Game Theory and Mathematical Methods
  
• 出版者：Birkh盲user Boston
• ISSN：2153-0793

文摘

We analyze effects of rarity value on the sustainability of a natural resource. Rarity value means that under extreme scarcity of the resource unit profits increase ‘explosively.’ We focus on equilibrium behavior of very patient agents in a Small Fish War. Agents interacting on a body of water have two options: they can fish with restraint or without. Fishing with restraint allows the fish stock to recover; fishing without yields higher immediate but lower future catches. We distinguish weak and strong rarity value; for the strong (weak) variant, total symmetric Pareto-efficient rewards are higher (lower) than those obtained by keeping the price fixed at highest-resource-stock level. Only for strong rarity value, the price effect more than compensates for smaller sustainable catches. Pareto-efficient equilibrium behavior dictates that lowest sustainable stocks are targeted. Keywords Stochastic games Limiting average rewards Common pool resource games Jointly-convergent strategies Rarity value