GSE Activity and Mortgage Supply in Lower-Income and Minority Neighborhoods: The Effect of the Affordable Housing Goals

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• 作者：Neil Bhutta (1) Neil.bhutta@frb.gov
• 关键词：GSE &#8211 ; Affordable housing goals &#8211 ; Low and moderate income &#8211 ; Mortgage
• 刊名：The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
• 出版年：2012
• 出版时间：June 2012
• 年：2012
• 卷：45
• 期：1
• 页码：238-261
• 全文大小：351.5 KB
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• 作者单位：1. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mail Stop 149, Washington, DC 20551, USA
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Regional Science
  Finance and Banking
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-045X

文摘

I estimate the credit supply effect of the Underserved Areas Goal (UAG), which establishes GSE purchase goals for mortgages to lower-income and minority neighborhoods. Taking advantage of discontinuous census tract eligibility rules and abrupt changes in tract eligibility, I find some evidence of a small UAG effect on GSE purchases and mortgage originations, without crowding-out of FHA and subprime lending. The results also suggest that the GSEs exploit the law’s lack of precision-targeting, yielding effects that might diverge from the law’s intent.