Cournot oligopolistic competition in spatially separated markets: The Stackelberg equilibrium

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Pablo Dorta-González ; Dolores R. Santos-Pe?ate and Rafael Suárez-Vega
• 关键词：JEL classification L13 ; R30
• 刊名：The Annals of Regional Science
• 出版年：2004
• 出版时间：September 2004
• 年：2004
• 卷：38
• 期：3
• 页码：499-511
• 全文大小：262 KB
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Regional Science
  Landscape, Regional and Urban Planning
  Microeconomics
  Environmental Economics
  Geography
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1432-0592

文摘

Consider a two-stage non-cooperative Cournot game with location choice involving r firms. There are n spatially separated markets located at the vertices of a network. Each firm, first selects the location of a facility and then selects the quantities to supply to the markets in order to maximize its profit. Non-zero conjectural variation at the second stage in the model by Sarkar et al. (1997) is studied. When the demand in each market is sufficiently large, equilibrium in the quantities offered by each firm in the markets exists. Furthermore, each firm chooses to locate its facility at the vertices.