Group Size and Gossip Strategies: An ABM Tool for Investigating Reputation-Based Cooperation

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• 作者：Francesca Giardini (6)
  Mario Paolucci (6)
  Diana Adamatti (7)
  Rosaria Conte (6)
  
• 关键词：Evolution of cooperation ; Reputation ; Gossip ; Punishment
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：9002
• 期：1
• 页码：104-118
• 全文大小：3,366 KB
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• 作者单位：Francesca Giardini (6)
  Mario Paolucci (6)
  Diana Adamatti (7)
  Rosaria Conte (6)
  
  6. ISTC-CNR, Roma, Italy
  7. Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande - FURG, Rio Grande, Brazil
  
• 丛书名：Multi-Agent-Based Simulation XV
• ISBN：978-3-319-14627-0
• 刊物类别：Computer Science
• 刊物主题：Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
  Computer Communication Networks
  Software Engineering
  Data Encryption
  Database Management
  Computation by Abstract Devices
  Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1611-3349

文摘

In an environment in which free-riders are better off than cooperators, social control is required to foster and maintain cooperation. There are two main paths through which social control can be applied: punishment and reputation. Using a Public Goods Game, we show that gossip, used for assortment under three different strategies, can be effective in large groups, whereas its efficacy is reduced in small groups, with no main effect of the gossiping strategy. We also test four different combinations of gossip and costly punishment, showing that a combination of punishment and reputation-based partner selection leads to higher cooperation rates.