Provisioning of Public Health Can Be Designed to Anticipate Public Policy Responses
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- 作者：Jing Li ; Darla V. Lindberg ; Rachel A. Smith…
- 关键词：Epidemiological games ; Infectious disease ; Community health ; Policy resistance ; Policy reinforcement ; Health commons
- 刊名：Bulletin of Mathematical Biology
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：January 2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：79
- 期：1
- 页码：163-190
- 全文大小：
- 刊物类别：Mathematics and Statistics
- 刊物主题：Mathematical and Computational Biology; Life Sciences, general; Cell Biology;
- 出版者：Springer US
- ISSN：1522-9602
- 卷排序：79
文摘
Public health policies can elicit strong responses from individuals. These responses can promote, reduce, and even reverse the expected benefits of the policies. Therefore, projections of individual responses to policy can be important ingredients in policy design. Yet our foresight of individual responses to public health investment remains limited. This paper formulates a population game describing the prevention of infectious disease transmission when community health depends on the interactions of individual and public investments. We compare three common relationships between public and individual investments and explain how each relationship alters policy responses and health outcomes. Our methods illustrate how identifying system interactions between nature and society can help us anticipate policy responses.