Common Pool Politics and Inefficient Fishery Management

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• 作者：Julia Hoffmann ; Martin F. Quaas
• 关键词：Fisheries ; Fishery economics ; Environmental uncertainty ; Constant escapement ; Political economy ; Dynamic game theory
• 刊名：Environmental & Resource Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：January 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：63
• 期：1
• 页码：79-93
• 全文大小：637 KB
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• 作者单位：Julia Hoffmann (1)
  Martin F. Quaas (1)
  
  1. Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Wilhelm-Seelig-Platz 1, 24118, Kiel, Germany
  
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Environmental Economics
  Economic Policy
  Economics
  Environmental Management
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-1502

文摘

Fisheries management often fails because total allowable catches (TACs) are set at inefficiently high levels. To study why decision-makers choose such high TACs, we model the annual negotiation on TACs as a dynamic game in discrete time. TACs are fixed by majority decision in a council consisting of decision-makers who are heterogeneous with respect to their discount rates. We show that the optimal feedback strategy for the less patient decision-makers will set inefficiently high TACs in Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. A binding commitment to a long-term management plan could help solving this problem and lead to a more sustainable fishery management.