The effects of the IMF on expropriation of foreign firms
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- 作者：Glen Biglaiser ; Hoon Lee ; Joseph L. Staats
- 关键词：Expropriation ; IMF ; Political constraints ; BITs ; WTO/GATT ; F5
- 刊名：The Review of International Organizations
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：March 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：11
- 期：1
- 页码：1-23
- 全文大小：417 KB
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Hoon Lee (2)
Joseph L. Staats (3)
1. Department of Political Science, University of North Texas, Denton, TX, USA
2. Department of Political Science, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, USA
3. Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Duluth, MN, USA - 刊物主题：Social Sciences, general; Political Science, general; Economics general;
- 出版者：Springer US
- ISSN：1559-744X
文摘
This paper seeks to explain the determinants of foreign expropriation in the developing world. We argue that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) helps to reduce the likelihood of nationalization because of the direct leverage the Fund holds over borrowers, especially as expropriation is a blatant violation of international property rights. Using expropriation data from 1961 to 2006, and several different measures for the Fund, we find that countries under IMF agreements are less likely to nationalize foreign firms. We also show that the Fund’s influence is greatest when the IMF loan represents a larger share of the borrower country’s gross domestic product (GDP) as well as in countries with weaker political institutions. The takeaway is that IMF continues to influence policy choices in the developing world. Keywords Expropriation IMF Political constraints BITs WTO/GATT