Kant鈥檚 Moral Theory and Demandingness

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• 作者：Alice Pinheiro Walla
• 关键词：Immanuel kant ; Imperfect duties ; Beneficence ; Perfect duties ; Demandingness
• 刊名：Ethical Theory & Moral Practice
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：August 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：18
• 期：4
• 页码：731-743
• 全文大小：186 KB
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• 作者单位：Alice Pinheiro Walla (1) (2)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
  2. Department of Philosophy, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland
  
• 刊物主题：Ethics; Political Philosophy; Ontology;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-8447

文摘

In this paper, I sketch a Kantian account of duties of rescue, which I take to be compatible with Kant鈥檚 theory. I argue that there is in fact no 鈥渢rumping relation鈥?between imperfect and perfect duties but merely that 鈥渓atitude shrinks away鈥?in certain circumstances. Against possible demandingness objections, I explain why Kant thought that imperfect duty must allow latitude for choice and argue that we must understand the necessary space for pursuing one鈥檚 own happiness as entailed by Kant鈥檚 justification of one鈥檚 duty to promote other鈥檚 happiness. Nevertheless, becoming worthy of happiness has always priority over one鈥檚 own happiness, even when circumstances are such that we cannot secure our own happiness without seriously neglecting more pressing needs of other persons. I conclude that Kant鈥檚 moral theory calls for complementation by the political and juridical domain. Implementing just political institutions and creating satisfactorily well-ordered societies create an external world which is friendlier to our attempts to reconcile moral integrity and a happy human life.