Diagnosing true virtue? Remote scenarios, warranted virtue attributions, and virtuous medical practice

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• 作者：Justin Oakley
• 关键词：Virtue ethics ; Virtue attribution ; Medical virtues ; Milgram experiments ; Kant ; Situationism ; Moral luck ; Friendship
• 刊名：Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：February 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：37
• 期：1
• 页码：85-96
• 全文大小：372 KB
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  8.Arthur, James, Kristján Kristjánsson, Hywel Thomas, Ben Kotzee, Agnieszka Ignatowicz, and Tian Qiu. 2015. Virtuous medical practice. Research Report. The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, University of Birmingham. http://​www.​jubileecentre.​ac.​uk/​1555/​projects/​gratitude
  itain/​virtuous-medical-practice . Accessed September 2, 2015.
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  11.Goldie, John, Lisa Schwartz, Alex McConnachie, and Jillian Morrison. 2003. Students’ attitudes and potential behaviour with regard to whistleblowing as they pass through a modern medical curriculum. Medical Education 37: 368–375.CrossRef
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  13.Aristotle. 1980. Nicomachean ethics. Trans. W.D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  14.Oakley, Justin. 2015. Practitioner courage and ethical health care environments. Hastings Center Report 45: 40–42.CrossRef
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  16.Milgram, Stanley. 2010. Obedience to authority: An experimental view. London: Pinter and Martin.
  17.Perry, Gina. 2012. Behind the shock machine. Melbourne: Scribe.
  18.Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Radio National. 2012. Behind the shock machine. All in the Mind. June 3. http://​www.​abc.​net.​au/​radionational/​programs/​allinthemind/​beyond-the-shock-machine/​4044812 . Accessed September 2, 2015.
  19.Stocker, Michael. 1976. The schizophrenia of modern ethical theories. Journal of Philosophy 73: 453–466.CrossRef
  20.Railton, Peter. 1984. Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs 13: 134–171.
  21.Cocking, Dean, and Justin Oakley. 1995. Indirect consequentialism, friendship, and the problem of alienation. Ethics 106: 86–111.CrossRef
  
• 作者单位：Justin Oakley (1)
  
  1. Centre for Human Bioethics, School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Menzies Building, 20 Chancellors Walk, Melbourne, VIC, 3800, Australia
  
• 刊物主题：Philosophy of Medicine; Ethics; Philosophy; History of Medicine; General Surgery;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-1200

文摘

Immanuel Kant argues in the Foundations that remote scenarios are diagnostic of genuine virtue. When agents commonly thought to have a particular virtue fail to exhibit that virtue in an extreme situation, he argues, they do not truly have the virtue at all, and our propensities to fail in such ways indicate that true virtue might never have existed. Kant’s suggestion that failure to show, say, courage in extraordinary circumstances necessarily silences one’s claim to have genuine courage seems to rely on an implausibly demanding standard for warranted virtue attributions. In contrast to this approach, some philosophers—such as Robert Adams and John Doris—have argued for probabilistic accounts of warranted virtue attributions. But despite the initial plausibility of such accounts, I argue that a sole reliance on probabilistic approaches is inadequate, as they are insufficiently sensitive to considerations of credit and fault, which emerge when agents have developed various insurance strategies and protective capacities against their responding poorly to particular eventualities. I also argue that medical graduates should develop the sorts of virtuous dispositions necessary to protect patient welfare against various countervailing influences (even where such influences might be encountered only rarely), and that repeated failures to uphold the proper goals of medicine in emergency scenarios might indeed be diagnostic of whether an individual practitioner does have the relevant medical virtue. In closing, I consider the dispositions involved in friendship. I seek to develop a principled way of determining when remote scenarios can be illuminating of genuine friendship and genuine virtue.