Masking AES with \(d+1\) Shares in Hardware

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• 关键词：AES ; DPA ; Masking ; Threshold implementation
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：9813
• 期：1
• 页码：194-212
• 全文大小：2,672 KB
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• 作者单位：Thomas De Cnudde (15)
  Oscar Reparaz (15)
  Begül Bilgin (15)
  Svetla Nikova (15)
  Ventzislav Nikov (16)
  Vincent Rijmen (15)
  
  15. KU Leuven, ESAT-COSIC and iMinds, Leuven, Belgium
  16. NXP Semiconductors, Leuven, Belgium
  
• 丛书名：Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems ¨C CHES 2016
• ISBN：978-3-662-53140-2
• 刊物类别：Computer Science
• 刊物主题：Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
  Computer Communication Networks
  Software Engineering
  Data Encryption
  Database Management
  Computation by Abstract Devices
  Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1611-3349
• 卷排序：9813

文摘

Masking requires splitting sensitive variables into at least \(d+1\) shares to provide security against DPA attacks at order d. To this date, this minimal number has only been deployed in software implementations of cryptographic algorithms and in the linear parts of their hardware counterparts. So far there is no hardware construction that achieves this lower bound if the function is nonlinear and the underlying logic gates can glitch. In this paper, we give practical implementations of the AES using \(d+1\) shares aiming at first- and second-order security even in the presence of glitches. To achieve this, we follow the conditions presented by Reparaz et al. at CRYPTO 2015 to allow hardware masking schemes, like Threshold Implementations, to provide theoretical higher-order security with \(d+1\) shares. The decrease in number of shares has a direct impact in the area requirements: our second-order DPA resistant core is the smallest in area so far, and its S-box is \(50\,\%\) smaller than the current smallest Threshold Implementation of the AES S-box with similar security and attacker model. We assess the security of our masked cores by practical side-channel evaluations. The security guarantees are met with 100 million traces.