High-Level Simulation for Multiple Fault Injection Evaluation

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• 作者：Maxime Puys (20)
  Lionel Rivi猫re (20) (21)
  Julien Bringer (20)
  Thanh-ha Le (20)
  
  20. SAFRAN Morpho ; Paris ; France
  21. T茅l茅com Paristech ; Paris ; France
  
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：8872
• 期：1
• 页码：293-308
• 全文大小：269 KB
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• 作者单位：Data Privacy Management, Autonomous Spontaneous Security, and Security Assurance
• 丛书名：978-3-319-17015-2
• 刊物类别：Computer Science
• 刊物主题：Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
  Computer Communication Networks
  Software Engineering
  Data Encryption
  Database Management
  Computation by Abstract Devices
  Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1611-3349

文摘

Faults injection attacks have become a hot topic in the domain of smartcards. This work exposes a source code-base simulation approach designed to evaluate the robustness of high-level secured implementations against single and multiple fault injections. In addition to an unprotected CRT-RSA implementation, we successfully attacked two countermeasures with the high-level simulation under the data fault model. We define a filtering criterion that operates on found attacks and we refine our simulation analysis accordingly. We introduce a broader fault model that consists in skipping C lines of code and exhibit benefits of such high-level fault model in term of simulation performance and attack coverage.