Combining High-Level and Low-Level Approaches to Evaluate Software Implementations Robustness Against Multiple Fault Injection Attacks

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• 作者：Lionel Rivi猫re (17) (18)
  Marie-Laure Potet (19)
  Thanh-Ha Le (17)
  Julien Bringer (17)
  Herv茅 Chabanne (17) (18)
  Maxime Puys (17)
  
  17. Safran Morpho ; Paris ; France
  18. T茅l茅com Paristech ; Paris ; France
  19. Verimag ; Gi猫res ; France
  
• 关键词：Fault injection ; Fault simulation ; Instruction skipping ; Control flow graph ; Multiple fault ; Smartcard ; Embedded systems ; Security
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：8930
• 期：1
• 页码：92-111
• 全文大小：615 KB
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• 作者单位：Foundations and Practice of Security
• 丛书名：978-3-319-17039-8
• 刊物类别：Computer Science
• 刊物主题：Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
  Computer Communication Networks
  Software Engineering
  Data Encryption
  Database Management
  Computation by Abstract Devices
  Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1611-3349

文摘

Physical fault injections break security functionalities of algorithms by targeting their implementations. Software techniques strengthen such implementations to enhance their robustness against fault attacks. Exhaustively testing physical fault injections is time consuming and requires complex platforms. Simulation solutions are developed for this specific purpose. We chose two independent tools presented in 2014, the Laser Attack Robustness (Lazart) and the Embedded Fault Simulator (EFS) in order to evaluate software implementations against multiple fault injection attacks. Lazart and the EFS share the common goal that consists in detecting vulnerabilities in the code. However, they operate with different techniques, fault models and abstraction levels. This paper aims at exhibiting specific advantages of both approaches and proposes a combining scheme that emphasizes their complementary nature.