Embodied savoir-faire: knowledge-how requires motor representations

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• 作者：Neil Levy
• 关键词：Knowledge ; how ; Epistemology ; Motor representations ; Stanley
• 刊名：Synthese
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：194
• 期：2
• 页码：511-530
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy of Science; Epistemology; Logic; Philosophy of Language; Metaphysics;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0964
• 卷排序：194

文摘

I argue that the intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which agents have the knowledge-how to \(\upvarphi \) in virtue of standing in an appropriate relation to a proposition, is only half right. On the composition view defended here, knowledge-how at least typically requires both propositional knowledge and motor representations. Motor representations are not mere dispositions to behavior (so the older dispositionalist view isn’t even half right) because they have representational content, and they play a central role in realizing the intelligence in knowledge-how. But since motor representations are not propositional, propositional knowledge is not sufficient for knowledge-how.