Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals

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• 作者：Maria E. Gallego (1)
  David Scoones (2)
  
• 刊名：Social Choice and Welfare
• 出版年：2011
• 出版时间：April 2011
• 年：2011
• 卷：36
• 期：3-4
• 页码：591-610
• 全文大小：321KB
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• 作者单位：Maria E. Gallego (1)
  David Scoones (2)
  
  1. Department of Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3C5, Canada
  2. Department of Economics, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, V8W 2Y2, Canada
  

文摘

A policy is the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash (Econometrica 18(2):155-62, 1950) bargaining framework. With heterogeneous parties, agreements and electoral outcomes depend on the concavity of the utility functions of negotiators and on the relative location of their ideal policies, i.e., depend on the negotiators relative willingness to compromise. Agreements between the bargainers may not follow the ordering of the parties-ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party comes from extreme voters may emerge.