Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules

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• 作者：Jun Iritani (1)
  Tomoyuki Kamo (2)
  Ryo-ichi Nagahisa (3)
  
• 刊名：Social Choice and Welfare
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：January 2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：40
• 期：1
• 页码：155-171
• 全文大小：220KB
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• 作者单位：Jun Iritani (1)
  Tomoyuki Kamo (2)
  Ryo-ichi Nagahisa (3)
  
  1. Graduate school of economics, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan
  2. Faculty of economics, Kyoto Sangyo University, Kyoto, Japan
  3. Faculty of economics, Kansai University, Suita, Japan
  

文摘

A binary relation is indifference-transitive if its symmetric part satisfies the transitivity axiom. We investigated the properties of Arrovian aggregation rules that generate acyclic and indifference-transitive social preferences. We proved that there exists unique vetoer in the rule if the number of alternatives is greater than or equal to four. We provided a classification of decisive structures in aggregation rules where the number of alternatives is equal to three. Furthermore, we showed that the coexistence of a vetoer and a tie-making group, which generates social indifference, is inevitable if the rule satisfies the indifference unanimity. The relationship between the vetoer and the tie-making group, i.e., whether the vetoer belongs to the tie-making group or not, determines the power structure of the rule.