Competition behavior in service frequency for U.S. airlines
详细信息    查看全文
文摘
Real-life service frequency data from markets with duopoly or oligopoly structure in the U.S. domestic airline industry is analyzed to understand whether the nature of airline competition is similar to one described by Hotelling’s law, as applied to a perishable goods market. The paired-samples t test statistic technique is employed to analyze 43,380 observations collected from thirty days worth of daily service frequencies in 1,000 largest U.S. city-pair markets. The results indicate that minimum differentiation competition behavior indeed prevails in duopoly markets. Firms are willing to locate far from the dominant player to capture consumer surplus in oligopoly markets.

© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号

地址:北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编:100083

电话:办公室:(+86 10)66554848;文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新:66554700