Benacerraf’s revenge

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• 作者：Ben Caplan (1)
  Chris Tillman (2)
  
• 关键词：Metaphysics of propositions ; Semantics ; Unity of propositions
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：December 2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：166
• 期：1-supp
• 页码：111-129
• 全文大小：236 KB
• 参考文献：1. Bealer, G. (1998). Propositions. / Mind, / 107(425), 1-2. CrossRef
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• 作者单位：Ben Caplan (1)
  Chris Tillman (2)
  
  1. Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
  2. University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada
  
• ISSN：1573-0883

文摘

In a series of recent publications, Jeffrey King (The nature and structure of content, 2007; Proc Aristot Soc 109(3):257-77, 2009; Philos Stud, 2012) argues for a view on which propositions are facts. He also argues against views on which propositions are set-theoretical objects, in part because such views face Benacerraf problems. In this paper, we argue that, when it comes to Benacerraf problems, King’s view doesn’t fare any better than its set-theoretical rivals do. Finally, we argue that his view faces a further Benacerraf problem, one that threatens to undercut his explanation of why propositions have truth-conditions. If correct, our arguments undercut King’s main motivation for accepting his view over its rivals.